Whose War is it, Anyway?

Writing in today's New York Times, Ted Koppel quotes an unnamed senior Jordanian intelligence official as saying that, "The United States is already at war with Iran; but for the time being the battle is being fought through surrogates," mainly Israel and Hezbollah.

Koppel imparts a number of intelligent comments and I recommend that you read the entire article, but what struck me most forcefully was this: "According to the Jordanian intelligence officer, Iran is reminding America’s traditional allies in the region that the United States has a track record of leaving its friends in the lurch — in Vietnam in the 70’s, in Lebanon in the 80’s, in Somalia in the 90’s." The Jordanian went on to suggest that the belief that we will do the same in Iraq has already led people in the region to start appeasing the Iranians.

For those of us who believe that the United States should never have got into Iraq, and that there is no way in which we can prevail there--indeed, no way to know what prevailing would be--this is a sobering observation. While we might scorn the line of reasoning that we must give more of our blood and treasure to vindicate the sacrifices already made (which has become the President's primary justification for continuing our involvement), it is another thing to consider the moral effect of leaving Iraq on a region that we have destabilized so severely by our misbegotten adventure.

On PBS' Washington Week in Review, Gwen Ifill asked ABC's Martha Raddatz if we have been fighting the wrong war. Raddatz demurred, saying "that's water over the dam." But clearly, the answer to the question is yes, we have. It was apparent in 2003 that Saddam Hussein was no threat (even if you believed--as I did at the time--that he had some "weapons of mass destruction"). It was clear then that the Iranian mullahs did pose a real danger, as they were already pursuing their nuclear ambitions and actively sponsoring terrorism against American interests and our ally, Israel. And while it was not so clear that a post-Saddam would be dominated by Shiites as it seems today, or that the Shiites would be as close to Iran as they now seem to be (Iraqi Shiites had long looked down on Iranians as some kind of country bumpkins), the possibility of such developments was foreseeable, and should have been chilling.

Still, we cannot reverse history; we are stuck with post-war Iraq, and with an Iran that has grown steadily more hostile to American interests. Worse, we have reduced our options and our leverage for dealing with the Iranians. And, as it happens, this comes at a time--also foreseeable--when the value of Iran's oil gives it more power than ever.

So, shall we stay in Iraq to prove that Americans don't always cut and run? Or will we be stronger in the long run by recognizing our folly and leaving that nation to its people? In the ultimate irony, our best friends in Iraq (apart from the Kurds)--the ones we would be seen to be leaving in the lurch by rapid withdrawal--are the Shiite allies of Iran.

None of the options are good.

This is how empires decline: they make a mistake here and a mistake there. They enter upon erroneous adventures and then abandon them. Soon enough, the psychological power of the empire diminishes, and with it real power as well.

In the short run, we see how disastrous Bush's foreign "policy" has been. In the longer run--in concert with the rest of our history since 1945--we may view the present as the prelude to disaster.